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22 September 1965

SUBJECT: LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR THE COMMUNIST FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

THE PROBLEM

The object of this study is to assess the nature and amount of the support being provided to the Communist military forces and the population under Communist control in South Vietnam, including the manner in which supplies are provided both from inside and from outside South Vietnam by land and by water. This study does not examine the problem of personnel infiltration.

CONCLUSIONS

A. The generally rugged terrain and dense vegetation along the long land border of South Vietnam offer an excellent environment for Communist infiltration into the country. The Communists, therefore, have made good use of a variety of land routes to infiltrate supplies into South Vietnam to support and maintain the insurgency movement. Substantial amounts of goods have also been brought in by sea, the long indented coastline and the great variety of small craft making control of seaborne infiltration quite difficult. (Paras. 1-4)

B. The People's Revolutionary (Communist) Party of South Vietnam is responsible for the complex task of providing funds for the Viet Cong war effort and of providing the bulk of the essential, non-military goods required. The Finance and Economic Section of the Party is the basic economic organization of the Viet Cong and the source of almost all

internally and some externally provided supplies. As the principal unit in the internal Viet Cong logistic network, the Finance and Economic Section works closely with the Rear Services Section of the Viet Cong military organization and with the various organizations of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV). The Viet Cong have developed a complex system of economic operations, including taxation, self-initiated economic activities, seizure, and clandestine operations, all of which are devoted to the goal of transferring financial and material resources from the South Vietnamese people to the Viet Cong military effort. In terms of actual receipts, taxation is probably the most important source of financial and material support which the Viet Cong have developed. Agricultural, plantation, transportation, and business taxes are imposed on a wide scale throughout Viet Cong-controlled areas of the country. (Paras. 5-11)

C. The Viet Cong are dependent on the countryside and on the rural population for most of their food supplies. In areas where food is not plentiful, Viet Cong food production units engage directly in agricultural activity. Because of the mild weather conditions clothing is not a major problem and Viet Cong requirements for clothing and other textile products are not extensive. The Viet Cong medical system is reasonably effective for the present level of fighting. Medical supplies are purchased on the open market in South Vietnam, captured from South Vietnamese government stocks, or procured from various Communist and Free World countries through Cambodia and North Vietnam. Viet Cong requirements for POL products are almost entirely filled by internal seizure or purchase.

Viet Cong requirements for construction materials are not known although most simple construction in base areas can be accomplished by the use of locally available materials. The quantities of weapons, explosives, and ammunition available to the Viet Cong are unknown, but it is quite clear that significant quantities of Communist Bloc weapons and Chinese Communist copies of these weapons have been infiltrated into the country. The effort of the Viet Cong to standardize on Communist Bloc type weapons in their main force units is indicative of a considerable degree of confidence in the logistic support which they are receiving from foreign sources. The present emphasis in local manufacture seems to be on the production of ammunition, hand grenades, and mines rather than on the production of rifles and more complicated weapons. The largest single source of telecommunications equipment used by the Viet Cong is made up of US-manufactured tactical radio sets captured from South Vietnamese army units. (Paras. 12-19)

D. The logistical system of the Viet Cong centers around the so-called base areas which serve not only as logistical support areas but also as centers for political, economic, and military action. The present Viet Cong system of the dispersion of supplies, however, renders effective attack and destruction by central government military forces very difficult. On the other hand, this fragmentation of storage areas is a basic restraint on the initiation of large-scale Viet Cong actions that require a sizeable prior concentration of supplies. Another major problem for the Viet Cong, as well as for the central government, has been the transport of large quantities of any commodity without disruption.

(Paras. 20-21)

E. The overland supply of weapons, ammunition, and other military supplies from North Vietnam apparently takes place over two major land routes through Laos. Both of these routes end in a series of seasonal roads and trails leading to forward supply points from which supplies are moved across the South Vietnamese border principally by means of porters and bicycles. The main link in the higher capacity route is route 23 which is a seasonal road that permits trucks to move from the Vinh area of North Vietnam to the Ban Dong area of Laos. From December 1964 through May 1965, when the road was truckable, the level of traffic moving south on route 23 averaged 17 trucks per day each of which carried an estimated 2 tons. After excluding the tonnage required by the Communist forces in the southern part of Laos about 2 tons per day on an annual basis probably were available to be sent to Communist forces in South Vietnam or to be stockpiled in Laos to support a higher level of activity in that area. The lower capacity supply route from North Vietnam involves a truck movement south from Vinh to the area of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) near the Laotian border from where supplies are carried by coolies to the Ban Dong area. (Paras. 22-25)

F. From Ban Dong supplies are trucked south on route 92 for a distance of 80 miles to the Se Kong River, about 20 miles east of Saravane. Before reaching this point, however, some supplies move from route 92 onto 3 eastbound routes, at least one of which, route 922, is seasonally motorable for light vehicular traffic to a point about 5 miles from the border of South Vietnam. From the southern end of route 92 some supplies are

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moved south in native craft on the Se Kong River or along a trail adjacent to the river to route 165 which is seasonally truckable and extends eastward to the South Vietnamese border through a possible maneuver and training area. The total quantity of supplies moved south on route 92 during the 1965 dry season is unknown, but over and above the amounts moving to the east from route 92 approximately 1 ton per day on an annual basis presumably was available to be moved forward from the end of route 92 to Communist forces located further south in Laos or along route 165 toward the South Vietnamese border. On the basis of all the evidence available it is estimated that a total of 1 to 3 tons of supplies per day is currently moving into South Vietnam over the land infiltration routes.

(Paras. 26-29)

G. The trucks moving south on routes 23 and 92 and the porters coming over the trails from the DMZ carried such items as ammunition, explosives, gasoline, clothing, food, medical supplies, and unidentified cargo. It is not known how far into South Vietnam some of these supplies are carried. The infiltration routes through Laos apparently are under North Vietnamese control, but within South Vietnam control shifts to Military Region V Headquarters of the Viet Cong. The porters on the trails in Laos are under control of the 70th or 71st Transportation Regiments (TR) and of the 72nd TR after crossing the border. As of mid-1964 about 3,000 men were supposedly maintaining the transportation corridor through Laos and another 1,700 or more were maintaining the route in the northern part of South Vietnam. The extent to which this porter system is functioning at present and the methods and number of men being used are not

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known. However, the entire Laotian border adjoining the South Vietnamese provinces of Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Kontum is interlaced with trails, many of which are probably being used. Pinpointing specific border crossing points is almost impossible, however, due to lack of information. (Paras. 30-34)

H. During 1957-64, large quantities of supplies apparently were infiltrated into South Vietnam by sea, principally to build stockpiles and to supply forces in the southern and coastal areas of the country. During 1963-64, both the scope of operations and the resources allocated to seaborne infiltration increased considerably. Although most seaborne infiltration operations originate in North Vietnam, there is evidence that a number of operations originate at points along the coast of Cambodia, and possibly also at points in Communist China. The information available indicates that seaborne infiltration of supplies has occurred primarily in the southern half of South Vietnam from about the 11th Parallel on the east coast around the cape to the Cambodian border. Some infiltration has also taken place into the four northern provinces of South Vietnam. (Paras. 35-38)

I. Since 1957 at least five major North Vietnamese organizations have reportedly been closely associated with seaborne infiltration of supplies into South Vietnam. The most important of these is Group 125, which is believed to be subordinate to the North Vietnamese Naval High Command.

25X1 [REDACTED]
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25X1 [REDACTED] Other organizations,

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such as the 103rd Transport Battalion (640 men and 48 junks), may also be engaged in sea infiltration, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] (Paras. 39-41)

J. Almost all types of ships and small craft have been used in infiltrating supplies into South Vietnam, including small wooden junks and sampans, steel-hulled ships, and coastal and oceangoing freighters. The types of military supplies entering South Vietnam by sea have included weapons, ammunition, food, clothing, and medical supplies. Although the amounts infiltrated in the past or being infiltrated at present cannot be determined, the lack of recent contact with infiltration boats may indicate that a lower level of sea infiltration is taking place at present than in past years. (Paras. 42-43)

K. Most of the supplies that enter South Vietnam by land and water from Cambodia consist of materials that can be purchased in the open market. These supplies are moved into South Vietnam by sea from Cambodian ports to islands in the Gulf of Siam or to the west coast of South Vietnam; by sampan or junk on the inland waterways; and by porters and vehicles on the motorable roads that approach or cross the South Vietnamese border. There is also a substantial open but illegal barter trade between South Vietnam and Cambodia, especially in the Mekong delta. Although many points along the border between Cambodia and South Vietnam have been mentioned in reference to Viet Cong border crossings, the relative importance of each area, route, or mode of transport cannot be determined with certainty from available information. However, the use of inland water transport to cross the border in the southern and delta

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area seems to be much more important than it is from the northeastern part of Cambodia into central South Vietnam. The Mekong-Bassac River complex particularly until 1964 was one of the major means of moving supplies across the border. The land routes provide access at many points along the Cambodian border for Viet Cong cadres, supporters, or purchasing agents to obtain necessary supplies. Motorable routes possibly used for this purpose include at least 6 roads that cross the border between Quang Duc Province and the Gulf of Siam. There is some evidence to indicate that before crossing the border porters fan out from the roads onto the complex of trails to portage their loads. In other cases agents mingle with the local traffic that crosses the border by vehicle or on foot. Little is known about the organizations that control the infiltration of supplies from Cambodia. (Paras 44-48)

L. Although Viet Cong units continue to operate with relative freedom on both sides of the Cambodian-Vietnamese border, there is no conclusive evidence that permanent Viet Cong bases have been established in Cambodian territory. Although there is very little proof of Cambodian government collusion with the Viet Cong at the top level, there is some evidence of both passive and active collusion at the local level. Beyond a recent gift of medical supplies, there is no hard evidence that the central Cambodian government is actively providing logistic support to the Viet Cong. There is no conclusive evidence that Communist arms being brought in openly through Sihanoukville are intended for other than the Cambodian armed forces. Actually it is difficult to estimate reliably the extent to which Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory is due to active

Cambodian cooperation, passive "laissez faire," or simply the inability of the Cambodian government to control or even patrol its frontiers. (Paras. 49-54)

M. The initial sources of externally provided supplies are principally Communist China, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, France, and the US. The countries through which most of these supplies pass immediately before infiltration into South Vietnam are most likely North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, although direct shipments to the South Vietnamese coast from other Bloc countries are possible. Supplies that are moved via North Vietnam most likely are transported by rail through Kwangsi Province, China, into North Vietnam. Although it is possible that war material is moved into Haiphong by merchant ship, no such shipments have been detected. For the most part, supplies for the Viet Cong that move from Cambodia arrive in Cambodia through normal commercial channels and principally aboard Free World ships. Very few ships from Communist countries call at Sihanoukville. The total tonnage they deliver is relatively small and the bulk of it consists of non-military supplies. Since 1963 there have been only about 10 Communist military deliveries to Cambodia. Most of this equipment was used to rearm Cambodian military units. (Paras. 55-59)

DISCUSSION

I. GENERAL

1. The rugged terrain of South Vietnam offers an excellent environment for the infiltration of supplies from adjoining areas and for clandestine movement within the country. South Vietnam is composed of the Mekong Delta, a coastal lowland, and a highland region. (See map at Annex.) The delta area is interlaced with about 2,500 miles of navigable canals, rivers, and streams and more than one-half of the area is flooded each summer and autumn. Most of this area is densely populated, and local water traffic is heavy. Patrolling this expanse of water, even if only at the border and along the coast, is an enormous task. Elsewhere, particularly in the rugged northern mountains, the country is relatively undeveloped, settlements are sparse, and transportation is poor.

2. The coastal lowland extending northward from the delta plain varies in width from 5 to 30 miles. In some places spurs of the highlands encroach on the lowlands and serve as potential avenues of ingress to the interior uplands. Where the highlands extend to the sea, many sheltered landing areas are found between the promontories and the steep rocky islands offshore. Between the coastal lowlands and the Mekong Valley lies the highland region, which extends from just northeast of the Mekong Delta northward into North Vietnam. North of about the 14th parallel the highlands consist mainly of steep mountain ridges with intervening deep, narrow valleys. The southern part of the highlands, however, is a complex

of mountain ranges and scattered plateaus. The mountains, with some peaks above 8,000 feet, and the deeply incised parts of the plateaus make surface transportation difficult.

3. The land boundaries of South Vietnam extend more than 900 miles, all of which adjoin Communist-controlled or unfriendly territory. On the east and south, for a distance of about 1,500 miles, the country fronts on the South China Sea and the Gulf of Siam. The boundary with Cambodia extends about 600 miles northeastward from the Gulf of Siam, about 460 miles of which is in the delta area and is crossed by numerous rivers and streams that are used as infiltration routes. The remainder of the boundary with Cambodia crosses forested plains and the hilly-to-mountainous western edge of the Annam Mountains. Established vehicular roads cross the Cambodian border in the delta area and in the forested plains north of Saigon, but the Viet Cong use trails to cross the border in numerous places. The entire border with Cambodia is an area of tension because of constant border clashes between the forces of both countries. The boundary with Laos continues generally northward for about 300 miles along the crest of the Annam Mountains. Passage across this boundary is generally tortuous; the best trail crossings and the ones apparently used most by the Viet Cong are in the northernmost part, where the border is hilly rather than mountainous. The demarcation line between North and South Vietnam, about 50 miles long, descends the eastern slope of the Annam Mountains and crosses hills and a narrow coastal plain to the South China Sea. The demilitarized zone extends 3 miles on each side of the demarcation line. An inoperable railroad and ^aroad cross this line, but normal

traffic on these routes has been stopped by military outposts on both sides of the border.

4. The full extent to which the Communists take advantage of the opportunities for penetration of these land and sea boundaries is unknown, but apparently all possible routes have been used to some extent in the past. The available information indicates that at present certain parts of the borders probably are more significant than others for infiltration purposes and that regular supply lines have been established over which clandestine supplies are obtained. The importance of the infiltration problem has been emphasized during 1964-65 by the increase in the tempo of Viet Cong operations in the northern area as well as in the delta and by the use of new types of weapons and ammunition not produced or reloaded in South Vietnam.

II. SUPPLIES AND FUNDS FOR THE COMMUNIST MILITARY FORCES AND THE POPULATION UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Internal Organization

5. The People's Revolutionary Party of South Vietnam is responsible for the complex task of providing funds for the revolutionary war effort and of providing the bulk of the essential, non-military goods for the Viet Cong organization. Operating through a vertical series of Party committees which exist on almost all geographical levels from village to the Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN), the Party has attempted to develop internal sources of funds and supplies for the war effort. A wide array of front, party, and military elements - under the over-all direction of the Party - implement the principal tasks of production, acquisition, and transportation of supplies. The Finance and Economic Section of the Party, the Rear Services Section of the Viet Cong military organization, and the various NFLSV units are the principal instrumentalities in these tasks. The Finance and Economic Section of the Party is the basic economic organization of the Viet Cong and the source of almost all internally and some externally provided supplies. At the province level and above, each Finance and Economic Section is headed by a policy level party cadre and includes the chief of the Rear Services Section of the Viet Cong main force units. It is the responsibility of the various finance and economic units to supervise the economy of Viet Cong-controlled areas, to acquire the money and goods required by the Viet Cong, and to implement economic programs designed to strengthen Viet Cong economic power and disrupt the economy of South Vietnam.

6. As the principal unit in the internal Viet Cong logistics network, the Finance and Economic Section works closely with the Rear Services Section of the Viet Cong military units and with the various NFLSV organizations. This relationship with the Rear Services Section provides the Finance and Economic Section with a channel for supplying military units with required goods and for calling upon the military for assistance in meeting economic tasks. A similar relationship exists with the NFLSV organizations. The Finance and Economic Section relies upon these organizations to supply civilian manpower for the economic tasks of the Party, and, in turn, attempts to meet the requirements of the civilian population by supplying the necessary goods.

Sources of Funds and Supplies

7. The Viet Cong appear to be largely self-sufficient with regard to almost all non-military supplies. They have developed a complex system of economic operations devoted clearly toward the goal of transferring financial and material resources from the South Vietnamese people to the Viet Cong military effort. Taxation, self-initiated economic activities, seizure, and clandestine operations appear to be the principal internal means of obtaining financial and material support for the Viet Cong.

8. In terms of actual receipts, taxation is probably the most important source of financial and material support for the Viet Cong. It has been estimated that the Viet Cong collect from \$30 million to \$60 million per year in all of South Vietnam. There is insufficient evidence to estimate actual tax collections in cash and in kind, but it is known that

the Viet Cong impose agricultural, plantation, transportation, and business taxes on a wide scale throughout the country. Although tax payments are probably the major source of local currency, bond drives, monetary issues, and clandestine fund drives also represent significant sources of local currency. There is no specific evidence of a Viet Cong shortage of funds, and in fact there have been unconfirmed reports that the Viet Cong are building a fund surplus to meet the costs of administering additional areas that may come under their control.

9. Agricultural taxation is probably the most important source of Viet Cong tax receipts. During the past crop year the Viet Cong employed progressive tax schedules on agricultural income with as many as 25 separate rates in the Mekong delta region along. If these rates had been applied only to rice production in Viet Cong-controlled areas of the delta, the collection of rice would have amounted to nearly 90,000 short tons, an amount far in excess of Viet Cong requirements in the delta or even on a national basis. ^{1/} Since equivalent Viet Cong tax rates are applied to other agricultural production in the delta, it is estimated that the Viet Cong collect far in excess of their nationwide food needs in the delta alone. In the central part of the country agricultural tax collections cannot be calculated because the tax has not been applied as systematically or as comprehensively as in the Mekong delta area.

^{1/} Based on the estimated shortfall of deliveries of rice to Saigon, Viet Cong tax collection of rice alone would have exceeded substantially the above estimate. There have been persistent reports that the Viet Cong may be smuggling rice into Cambodia to acquire foreign exchange or otherwise generate funds for their effort. However, the amount of rice actually disposed of through Cambodia is not known.

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However, there is little doubt that even in this area the agricultural tax supplies a significant portion of Viet Cong needs for rice, salt, manioc, fish, and other foodstuffs. In addition, in this area the Viet Cong often purchase, or confiscate rice and salt.

10. Plantation taxes also account for a significant portion of Viet Cong tax receipts. The proximity of the rubber plantations to war zones C and D (see map at Annex) provides a reliable means of supply for Viet Cong forces in these areas. Since the plantations possess large stocks of rice, medicine, POL, and other supplies and have long been vulnerable to Viet Cong economic pressure, the plantations probably are a significant source of critical supplies for the Viet Cong.

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the annual plantation tax is approximately 1,000 piasters (\$13.70) per hectare or a total of about \$1 million for the exploitable area of 75,000 hectares. Wage taxes on plantation workers and Viet Cong demands for labor service for transportation are also known to exist on a wide scale. Most of the internal transport of the country, both personal and commercial, is also taxed by the Viet Cong, although it is impossible to estimate total receipts in cash and kind from this source. Taxes are also imposed on business establishments and commercial activities. Small rice and sugar mills are taxed in areas outside of the control of the government of South Vietnam; woodcutters, charcoal kilns, and sawmills, because of their location, are easy prey for the Viet Cong. Import and export taxes are levied against trade between Viet Cong and central government-controlled areas in order to provide revenue and to promote a favorable trading pattern for the Viet Cong.

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Thus, the import of medicines, cloth, POL, and printing supplies into Viet Cong-controlled areas is not taxed at all by the Viet Cong, but the export of metal from Viet Cong areas is forbidden completely.

11. Despite the considerable financial and material resources available to the Viet Cong through tax collection and other financial operations such as bond drives, monetary issues, and the use of credit cooperatives, additional economic activities have been initiated to support Viet Cong military personnel and the civilian population under Viet Cong control. For example, major efforts at the self-production of foodstuffs, especially rice and manioc, have been made in the central highlands. Clothing production units have been established as subordinate elements of the Rear Services Section of the Viet Cong military organization. Simple manufacturing units, which produce farm implements for the civilian population, also produce military goods such as mines, grenades, and rifles. Where materials are not ordinarily available through other means they are often seized outright, although it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between seizure through force and enforced tax collections. However, the Viet Cong do accumulate significant supplies as war booty, including medicines, communications equipment, foodstuffs, and military equipment. Clandestine front operations in areas controlled by the government of South Vietnam and involvement of legitimate enterprises in Viet Cong procurement operations are considered to be common in many provinces. These operations do not provide revenue, but these organizations act as procurement agencies to obtain essential supplies for the Viet Cong from areas controlled by the central government. Medicines, cloth, and foodstuffs are supplied

by these clandestine operations. The quantity of goods acquired by this means or the value of the funds expended cannot be determined.

Critical Items of Supply

12. As mentioned above, the Viet Cong are dependent on the countryside and on the rural population for most of their food. Viet Cong taxation policy permits payment in rice, manioc, fish, salt, and other food items. In areas where food is not plentiful, Viet Cong food production units engage directly in agricultural activity. In the mountainous areas particularly, the Viet Cong spend a considerable number of man-days per year in the production of food. Prior to June 1963, the Viet Cong military units and administrative agencies were directed by COSVN to provide their own subsistence for a period of 4 months per year, with the remaining 8 months of subsistence furnished by COSVN. From June 1963 to June 1964, all units were required to furnish 100 percent of their own subsistence. Since June 1964, combat units have provided 50 percent of their own food and all other units 100 percent. Some reports have indicated that the Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN) battalions operating in the northern part of South Vietnam receive some of their rice supplies from external sources.

13. The Viet Cong requirements for clothing and other textile products such as hammocks and mosquito nets are not extensive. Because of the mild weather conditions clothing especially is not a major problem. A number of items of clothing used by the Viet Cong, such as khaki uniforms, underwear, winter clothing for the mountain regions, and hammocks

are produced in North Vietnam. For the most part these items have been issued to infiltrators who generally carry an individual supply of two uniforms, knapsack, hammock, and mosquito net when entering the country. Clothing production units also exist as elements of the Rear Services Section of the Viet Cong military organization. In addition the Viet Cong obtain cloth internally by discreet purchase and externally from Cambodian sources.

14. The Viet Cong medical system is reasonably effective for the present level of fighting. Aid stations, hospitals, and rest centers are located within South Vietnam and probably have been located temporarily in Cambodia and Laos from time to time. Approximately 48 of these medical facilities have been identified, some of which are reported to be well-staffed and supplied even with such sophisticated equipment as x-ray machines, laboratory facilities, and dental chairs. One major source of medical supplies is the open market in South Vietnam. With the exception of opiates and barbiturates most drugs can be purchased without difficulty in pharmacies in the larger cities. Another major source consists of captured South Vietnamese medical supplies. Some Viet Cong military operations have been specifically directed toward obtaining these supplies from hamlets and supply convoys. Finally, medical supplies are procured from various Communist and Free World countries through Cambodia and North Vietnam.

15. North Vietnam in particular appears to be engaged in building up its supplies of pharmaceuticals. North Vietnamese imports of penicillin

and blood plasma - both of which are widely used in treating battle casualties - have risen sharply in 1965 and appear to be well in excess of normal requirements. Although other Communist countries have been the predominant suppliers of most pharmaceuticals, Japan has provided virtually all the blood plasma imported by North Vietnam. The actual quantity of pharmaceuticals being shipped from North Vietnam to the Viet Cong is not known, but it is believed to be adequate for their needs. In addition to equipping the PAVN forces now fighting in South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese reportedly have used infiltrators to carry small packets of medical supplies containing such items as penicillin, sulfa drugs, and quinine derivatives to the Viet Cong. Because of the relative ease of transporting large quantities of pharmaceuticals, it would be possible for North Vietnam to deliver substantial quantities of medical supplies by small coastal vessels and over the land infiltration routes. Once in South Vietnam these supplies would presumably be stored in central areas near base hospitals. However, there are no known large stockpiles of medical supplies.

16. Viet Cong requirements for POL products are probably quite small. They have few organic vehicles or self-propelled vessels but do need fuel for power generators and other power driven equipment. Taxation of the contents of petroleum tank trucks, outright seizure of petroleum supplies, and discreet purchase from local gasoline stations throughout the country are known methods of acquisition from internal sources.

17. The requirements of the Viet Cong for construction materials are

unknown. Simple construction in base areas can probably be accomplished by the use of locally available materials, mainly timber. Although the Viet Cong have been known to seize convoys carrying supplies of cement, their access to other internal and external sources of construction materials is not known.

18. The Viet Cong supply of weapons, explosives, and ammunition has been accumulated from various sources: supplies buried or left behind by retreating government forces in South Vietnam or Laos; supplies infiltrated primarily through North Vietnam and Cambodia; captured supplies; and locally-produced supplies. The available quantities of these weapons, explosives, and ammunition are unknown, but it is evident that significant quantities of Communist Bloc weapons and Chinese Communist copies of these weapons have been infiltrated into South Vietnam for use by the Viet Cong. This flow of weapons from outside South Vietnam has enabled the Viet Cong to achieve some progress in weapons standardization within priority units. Non-standard weapons and those of World War II vintage are being passed on to the guerrillas and other armed militia units. The effort of the Viet Cong to standardize on Communist Bloc type weapons in their main force units is indicative of a considerable degree of confidence in the logistic support which they are receiving from foreign sources. Although the Viet Cong have placed a great deal of emphasis on the capture of weapons and ammunition in the past, this emphasis may decrease as their main force units become increasingly equipped with the new family of Bloc weapons. The present emphasis in local manufacture seems to be on the production of ammunition, hand grenades, and mines rather than on the production of

rifles and more complicated weapons. The majority of the Viet Cong production facilities are located south and west of Saigon. Annex A contains a list, by country of origin, of Bloc-supplied and locally-produced weapons and ammunition probably held by the Viet Cong main force units.

19. The largest single source of telecommunications equipment used by the Viet Cong is made up of US-manufactured tactical radio sets captured from South Vietnamese army units. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The types of radio equipment captured range from hand-held, low power transceivers to relatively large, vehicle-mounted transmitters having power ratings of from 300 to 400 watts. This captured equipment has been augmented to a limited extent by comparable equipment of Soviet and Communist Chinese manufacture supplied from North Vietnam. Such supply, however, is not believed to be essential to Viet Cong operations.

Redistribution Routes and Storage Areas for Supplies

20. The ability of the Viet Cong to meet the requirements of their military forces and the civilian population under their control has been hampered by the threat of central government military action, the difficulties of internal transport, and the central government restrictions imposed on normal commerce. The influx of an estimated 500,000 refugees into areas of central South Vietnam controlled by the central government reflects, in part, the inability of the Viet Cong to guarantee supplies

[REDACTED]

to the civilian population. Although this displacement of the rural population has reduced the demand on the Viet Cong supply system, it has also reduced agricultural production and impaired the ability of the Viet Cong to procure food and other goods locally. A major problem for the Viet Cong, as well as for the central government, has been the transport of large quantities of any commodity without disruption. The Viet Cong are believed to have only limited access to transport vehicles which can be used only at night or after considerable effort at deception. Although transport by boat in the delta and coastal areas is employed by the Viet Cong, the use of porters is probably the principal means used to ensure the movement of essential supplies in the central highlands.

21. The logistical system of the Viet Cong centers around the so-called base areas which serve not only as logistical support areas but also as centers for political, economic, and military action. The present Viet Cong system of the dispersion of supplies, however, renders effective attack and destruction by central government military forces very difficult. In 1963, when Viet Cong forces in the central highlands were significantly smaller than at present, food depots were limited to a maximum of 5 tons because of the threat of central government military action. Although the size of these depots has probably been increased because of the additional troop concentrations in central South Vietnam, the fragmentation of storage areas is a basic restraint on the initiation of large-scale Viet Cong actions that require a sizeable prior concentration of supplies. See the map at Annex for the location of war zones, storage areas, and redistribution corridors to the Viet Cong forces operating within South Vietnam.

III. LAND INFILTRATION FROM NORTH VIETNAM

Supply Routes and Quantities of Supplies Moved

22. There is a scarcity of information on the overland supply of weapons, ammunition, and other military supplies from North Vietnam to the northern provinces of South Vietnam. It appears, however, that two major land routes from North Vietnam into Laos serve as a means of transporting supplies. Both of these routes end in a series of seasonal roads and trails leading to forward supply points. From these points in Laos supplies are moved across the South Vietnamese border by means of porters, bicycles, ox carts, or pack animals.

23. The higher capacity route is a road that in part is useable in the dry season only. It is used from about mid-December through May or June to supply the Communist forces in the southern part of Laos and the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. Supplies from North Vietnam are trucked in stages along routes 1A and 15 through Mu Gia Pass into Laos, and then south on routes 12 and 23 to supply dumps located along routes 23 and 9. ^{2/} Some supplies moving along this route eventually reach Ban Dong at the junction of routes 9 and 92 and then move down route 92 toward the South Vietnamese border. Although route 23 is a significant part of this supply line, it is a seasonal road on which truck traffic can hardly move from about June through November each year due to ground saturation caused by the southwest monsoons.

^{2/} [redacted]
route 23 close to route 9 has indicated that many convoys do not move all the way from route 23 to route 9 and that there is a lower level of traffic in this area than along the northern part of route 23.

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24. Before the completion of route 23 in 1962, supplies for the Communist forces in southern Laos were moved by air. During January-June 1963, however, many large truck convoys were observed moving south on route 23. Although most of these trucks carried troops and supplies for the southern part of Laos, some of the supplies may have been portered over the trails into the northern provinces of South Vietnam. Again in 1964 the convoys moved during the dry season.

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During the 1965 dry season bombing and armed reconnaissance missions reduced the estimated capacity of route 23 from 400 tons each way per day to 100 tons. These aerial attacks probably did not reduce the actual traffic moving to a level below that planned or needed by the Communist forces, however.

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it is possible to estimate

that the level of traffic moving south on route 23 averaged 17 trucks per day. (See Annex B) It is believed that these trucks carried about 2 tons each and that the road was probably truckable for a total of about 180 days during the dry season. Although the bombing and aerial reconnaissance did not reduce the total amount of traffic moving south, it did slow down the movement and force some portaging of supplies. This level of activity is estimated to have been capable of moving about 34 tons of military supplies into the area per day. The approximately 8,000 Communist troops in the southern part of Laos needed 30 of the 34 tons received per day during the dry season (15 tons for daily consumption and 15 tons for stockpiling in anticipation of the halt in traffic during the rainy season).

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Thus there could have been an excess of 4 tons per day delivered to the area during the 1965 dry season. On an average annual basis this tonnage would represent about 2 tons per day available to be sent to the Communist forces in South Vietnam or to be stockpiled in Laos to support a higher level of Communist activity in that area.

25. The lower capacity supply route from North Vietnam is the older of the two land infiltration routes. It involves a truck movement south from Vinh to the area of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) near the Laotian border. From there supplies are carried by coolies to the Ban Dong area in Laos at the junction of routes 9 and 92 where they may be loaded on trucks for further movement south. Other groups of coolies may operate independently of the route 23/9/92 supply line. There have been sporadic reports [] of groups of 100 to 300 coolies carrying supplies south toward Ban Dong. There have not been enough of these reports, however, to estimate with confidence the amount of supplies moving by this means. These porter movements apparently take place during the wet season, possibly indicating that the trails are used for the most part when trucks cannot move on route 23.

26. Route 92 is the beginning of a supply network that supports Communist activities in the southeastern area of the Laotian Panhandle and across the border into South Vietnam. Route 92 extends south from Ban Dong on route 9 for a distance of about 80 miles and ends at the Se Kong River, about 20 miles east of Saravane. Although ~~the northern~~ section has a possible limited all-season capability, the southern part is truckable only in the dry season. [] route 92

and adjacent areas has identified at least two primary military supply installations near Ban Bac. Route 92 also serves as a feeder route to suspected military supply dumps located along 3 eastbound routes, at least one of which is an important supply route to South Vietnam. These routes are 921, 922, and 923. [redacted] indicate that sections of these routes may be seasonally motorable for light vehicular traffic. 3/ [redacted] indicated that vehicular activity had occurred on route 922 from its junction with route 92 to a point about 15 miles east where route 922 divides into two segments. Each of these 1 to 2 mile segments also showed evidence of recent vehicular activity. Thus it appears that in the dry season supplies can be transported by truck all the way from North Vietnam to a point only about 5 miles from the border of South Vietnam.

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27. From the southern end of route 92 some supplies are moved south in native craft on the Se Kong River to route 165 which extends eastward to the South Vietnamese border through a possible maneuver and training area. Route 165 is also connected to route 16 by a short unnumbered road. In this area an improved trail generally parallels the Se Kong River and connects the southern terminus of route 92 with route 165. [redacted] [redacted] the northern section of this trail was being upgraded into a road at the end of the 1965 dry season. It is likely that the entire trail along the river will be upgraded after the present wet season. When this work is completed the Communists will have a second fair-weather

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truckable route from route 92 to the South Vietnamese border.

28. The total quantity of supplies moved south on route 92 during the 1965 dry season cannot be estimated because traffic on the road has been observed only near its southern end. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] some trucks leave route 92 north of the observers and move supplies toward the South Vietnamese border on routes, such as 922, which are at least seasonally motorable for light vehicular traffic. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] truck traffic moving near the southern end of route 92. From 1 February through 5 June, the period that the road was truckable, the level of traffic averaged about 1.5 trucks moving south per day (See Annex B) If it is estimated that these trucks carried about 2 tons each, a total of about 375 tons could have been moved south during the dry season. On an annual basis this quantity amounts to a daily average of slightly more than 1 ton that presumably was available to be moved forward from the end of route 92 to Communist forces located further south in Laos, to the possible training and maneuver area along route 165, or over the border into South Vietnam.

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29. Based on the above analyses of the possible volumes of tonnage available for movement over routes 92, 922, and 165 and the fact that some movement takes place directly over the trails from the western end of the DMZ, it is estimated that a total of from 1 to 3 tons of supplies per day is currently moving into South Vietnam over the land infiltration routes.

Types of Supplies Moved

30. The trucks that moved south on route 23 during the 1965 dry season carried such items as ammunition for small arms, mortars, and recoilless rifles; explosives; gasoline; clothing; and foodstuffs such as rice, salt, flour, dried meat, and dried fish. The northbound trucks reportedly carried lumber, bamboo, and salvage items such as empty gasoline drums and tires. The contents of about half of the trucks moving near the southern end of route 92 was not observed, but almost 30 percent reportedly carried boxes, 15 percent a combination of arms, ammunition, and food, and the remainder sacks with unidentified cargo. About a third of the trucks moving north reportedly were empty. Many of the porters coming over the trails from near the western end of the DMZ to route 92 or directly to points along the border of South Vietnam are reported to have carried weapons, ammunition, equipment, medical supplies and foodstuffs. It is not known how far into South Vietnam some of these supplies are carried, but it is only logical to assume that at least the food carried over the trails would not be moved beyond the mountainous border area.

Organizational Control

31. The infiltration routes through Laos apparently are under North Vietnamese control, but within South Vietnam control shifts to Military Region V Headquarters. [redacted] indicate that as of mid-1964 the 70th Transportation Regiment (TR) and possibly a 71st TR control the porters and infiltrators on the trails through Laos. The 70th TR was said to be a part of the 559th Transportation Division which is

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under direct control of the PAVN High Command in Hanoi. At the border of South Vietnam near the boundary between Thua Thien and Quang Nam Provinces the supplies and infiltrators become the responsibility of the 72nd TR which maintains the communications-liaison route through Quang Nam to southern Quang Tin Province. The 70th TR reportedly maintains about 17 communications-liaison stations in Laos with the first station located near the end of the DMZ. A company of about 100 able-bodied men is located at each station to carry out security, communications, liaison, and guidance of infiltrators and locally recruited porters. ^{4/} It is not known whether the supplies transported by truck down route 23 are also the responsibility of the 70th TR. It is possible that such supplies are turned over to the 70th TR at the end of the truck route. The 71st TR was reported ^{5/} to control a short segment of the route between A Rum, a village located near the end of route 922, and some point within Quang Nam Province. It was said to have 12 stations, also with one company at each station or a total of about 1,200 men for the 12 stations. The 72nd TR had about 24 stations maintained by a total of 1,700 men. Thus as of mid-1964 about 3,000 men were supposedly maintaining the transportation corridor through Laos and another 1,700 or more were maintaining the route in the northern part of South Vietnam.

^{4/} The apparent inconsistency between the reports of 100 men at each station and the reports of up to 300 porters on the trails can be explained by the possibility that porters are recruited locally or are moved from one station to another whenever needed for unusually large movements.

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Modes of Transportation and Border Crossing Points

32. Trucks, porters, and native craft on the inland rivers are all used to some extent, depending on the season and location, to bring supplies to the South Vietnamese border. The staged movement by truck from North Vietnam into Laos has been described above. Along the trails the way stations are said to be located about one-half day's march apart. The short distances, anywhere from 4 to 12 miles, depending on terrain and the tactical situation, allow the porters to haul supplies to the next station and return to their home base within one working day. The extent to which this porter system is functioning at present and the methods and number of men being used are not known. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] portions of the trails were being upgraded into roads and that he had seen trucks being used on portions of the route. He had apparently observed route 922. Other infiltrators who crossed the border in early 1965 observed pack bicycles more often than porters. The use of bicycles would considerably reduce the number of porters needed. The porters carry 40 to 60 lb-loads in back packs or shoulder poles while single or dual bicycles can carry up to 500 lb-loads. Annex C lists several additional methods used for packaging and transporting supplies.

33. Only one waterway in Laos, the Se Kong River mentioned above, is known to be used to any extent as part of an infiltration route, although the alignment of other waterways, the Se Bang Hieng, Se Pone, and the Song Ben Hai, makes them suspect infiltration routes. [REDACTED]

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craft on the river, and portages of difficult sections. This waterway is navigable perennially by sampans, but its use during the dry season will probably be reduced when the road being built parallel to it is completed, possibly by the end of 1965. The Song Ben Hai/Rao Thanh waterway in the DMZ forms the border between North and South Vietnam. Although infiltration across this river of 3 to 4 man teams swimming or using small craft has been reported, infiltration of supplies across the river has not been observed. Utilization by sampans of this waterway perennially for lateral movement within the DMZ to interior tracks, trails, and tributary streams providing access to South Vietnam is possible, however.

34. Apparently the major border crossing points, as shown on the map at Annex, consist of the trail networks east and southeast of route 922 and route 165. However, the entire Laotian border adjoining the South Vietnamese provinces of Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Kontum is interlaced with trails, many of which are probably being used. Pinpointing specific border crossing points is impossible due to lack of information. Thick forest coverage of the roads and trails make aerial reconnaissance of these routes difficult. Captured personnel, even the communications-liaison personnel who worked on the routes, lack knowledge of the routes used because of the strict security system applied to the infiltration process.

IV. SEA INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES

Supply Routes, Embarkation Areas, and Debarkation Areas

35. The Communists have been using seaborne infiltration to transport men and supplies into South Vietnam since 1957. Although the number of personnel infiltrated by sea has been relatively small, large quantities of supplies have apparently been infiltrated by sea in past years. These supplies are believed to have been used principally to build stockpiles and to supply forces in the southern and coastal areas of South Vietnam, which are more easily supplied by sea than by land.

36. Seaborne infiltration directly into South Vietnam takes place principally from two countries - Cambodia and North Vietnam. The embarkation areas in Cambodia are at the port of Kampot or on the coast between Kampot and the border of South Vietnam. The embarkation areas in North Vietnam are located in two general areas - in the north, near Haiphong and Bai Chay, and in the south, along the coast between Ben Thuy and the 17th Parallel. About 15 embarkation points and 3 logistic supply bases have been reported in North Vietnam.

37. The routes used by infiltration boats evidently vary according to the type of mission and the season of the year. Infiltration operations from Cambodia, which originate in the area between Kampot and the border of South Vietnam, proceed to Phu Du, Phu Quoc, or one of the other nearby islands, and finally to the western coast of South Vietnam. It seems reasonable to assume that some seaborne infiltration takes

place directly between Cambodia and the western coast, although there is little tangible evidence to support this. Some reports state that seaborne infiltration also is conducted by foreign ships which stop off the coast of South Vietnam while the cargo is unloaded into lighters that transfer it to shore. Most of the seaborne infiltration is assumed to take place over routes from North Vietnam. Infiltration by ship from North Vietnam reportedly has taken place in past years only from December through August, except for emergencies, because of the rough seas usually encountered during the rest of the year. One informant, who participated in several infiltration missions from North Vietnam, mentioned two routes, a "near-shore" route, paralleling the coast at about 3 miles offshore, and a "distant-shore" route, ranging from 50 to 100 miles from the coast.

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Some of the ships or craft involved

in the infiltration from North Vietnam probably leave the northern areas and stop at ports in the southern area of the country before continuing their trip into South Vietnam. Others also may stop at Communist China's Hainan Island on the way to the south.

38. Infiltration boats or ships are reported or suspected to have landed, unloaded, or been seen on the coasts of 16 of the 21 coastal provinces of South Vietnam. (See map at Annex.) In addition, one other province reportedly has parts of its coastline held by the Viet Cong and could provide safe landing areas for supplies. Most of the reported or suspected landings or sightings, however, appear to have taken place in the four northern provinces of South Vietnam (Quang Tri, Thua Thien,

Quang Nam, and Quang Tin) and in the southern part of the country from Binh Tuy Province (east of Saigon) along the coast to the Cambodian border and the islands of Hon Khoai and Phu Quoc. Apparently small junks and sampans from North Vietnam have been engaged in infiltration from North Vietnam to the northern provinces of South Vietnam, while larger craft have been carrying supplies to the southern part of South Vietnam, supplemented by small junks and sampans from Cambodia and Phu Quoc island. Coastal and oceangoing freighters could offload supplies along any part of the South Vietnamese coast, but reports indicate that most of the sightings of these ships have taken place in the southern part of the country, south of 10 15 N. Debarkations reportedly are made usually at night, with boats using both "near-shore" and "distant-shore" routes waiting offshore until landings can be made under cover of darkness.

Organizational Control and Estimated Inventory of Infiltration Ships

39. Since 1957 at least five major North Vietnamese organizations have reportedly been closely associated with seaborne infiltration of Viet Cong personnel and supplies into South Vietnam. These were (1) the Unification Agency, reportedly in existence from 1956 to 1960; (2) the Ong-Xa Group, reportedly a military organization in existence between 1959 and 1960; (3) the Research Bureau, reportedly in existence from 1961 through at least 1963; (4) the 603rd Special Battalion of the PAVN; and (5) Group 125, believed to be subordinate to the North Vietnamese Naval High Command. The complete absence of reports since 1963 on the first two organizations makes it probable that they have been disbanded,

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reorganized, or merged with other infiltration organizations.

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
the "603rd Special Battalion" probable is still actively engaged in infiltration activities.


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this battalion as a special maritime infiltration unit of the PAVN stationed south of the Gianh River (about 19 miles northwest of Dong Hoi), North Vietnam.

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41. In addition to the major seaborne infiltration organizations discussed above, initial interrogations of six Viet Cong captured on 31 May 1965 indicate the possible existence of another large infiltration organization (640 men and 48 junks). This organization, the 103rd Transport Battalion ^{7/}, reportedly has been conducting infiltration by rotating operation of its junks in 4 groups of 12 each. 

 In 1965 an additional method of infiltration has been noted. This method consists of the Viet Cong obtaining South Vietnamese ships and crews on a temporary basis by either hiring or coercing owners and personnel. The crews then take the ships to North Vietnam, where supplies are loaded, and the ships then return to South Vietnam. This method apparently has been used only a few times and has been confined to infiltration in the northern provinces of South Vietnam. The organization responsible for instigating this type of operation is unknown.

^{7/} The similarity between the unit designations of the 103rd and 603rd Battalions should be noted.

Forms of Sea Transportation Used

42. Almost all types of ships and small craft have been used in infiltrating supplies into South Vietnam for the Viet Cong. These vessels include small wooden junks and sampans, steel-hulled ships, and coastal and oceangoing freighters. Small sampans and junks have been used to carry cargo ashore, whereas some junks and freighters have been reported as transporting cargo to offshore locations. Some of the North Vietnamese junks involved are apparently faster and better armed than the boats of the South Vietnamese Junk Fleet. An infiltration ship sunk at Vung Ro on 16 February 1965, for example, was a 120-foot, steel-hulled ship with an estimated cargo capacity of 100 tons, and a cruising speed of 8 knots. The motorized boats of the Junk Fleet have a speed of only 6 to 8 knots. Since 10 percent to 30 percent of the 50,000 commercial craft registered with the South Vietnamese government are off the coast on any given day, the problems involved in detecting any planned infiltration movements are formidable. However, in view of the greatly increased scope of patrol coverage since early 1965 the absence of any further incidents involving steel-hulled infiltration vessels since the Vung Ro sinking in February suggests that the Viet Cong are now using only smaller craft which are more easily concealed.

Types and Quantities of Supplies Moved

43. The types of military supplies entering South Vietnam by sea have included weapons, ammunition, food, clothing, and medical supplies. Neither the amount of supplies infiltrated by sea into South Vietnam

in the past nor the amount presently being infiltrated can be quantified with any degree of reliability on the basis of available information. However, the fact that Group 125 apparently failed to make any infiltration attempts to South Vietnam between February and September 1965 may indicate that a lower level of sea infiltration is taking place at present than in past years.

V. INFILTRATION OF SUPPLIES FROM CAMBODIA

44. Although there is evidence that certain supplies for the Viet Cong enter South Vietnam by land and water from Cambodia, it is fragmentary and of varying reliability. In general, however, it appears that supplies procured in or through Cambodia consist of materials that can be purchased on the open market. These supplies and materials arrive in Cambodia principally through normal trade channels on international ships that unload at Gulf of Siam ports or at Phnom Penh after moving up the Mekong River. ^{8/} Some supplies may be infiltrated from southern Laos on the inland waterways, roads, and trails in northeastern Cambodia, [REDACTED]

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Once within Cambodia supplies are moved into South Vietnam by the following routes and methods: (a) by sea from Cambodian ports to islands in the Gulf of Siam and to the west coast of South Vietnam; ^{9/} (b) by sampan or junk on the inland waterways; and (c) by porters and vehicles on the motorable roads that approach or cross the South Vietnamese border. There is also a substantial open but illegal barter trade between South Vietnam and Cambodia, especially in the Mekong delta. The general locations of the major routes are indicated on the map at Annex. Many points along the border between Cambodia and South Vietnam have been mentioned in reference to Viet Cong border crossings, but Tay Ninh and An Giang ^{10/} have been the two

^{8/} See Section VI, below, for a discussion of Cambodian international shipping and trade.

^{9/} This route has been described as a sea infiltration route in section IV, above.

^{10/} During 1964 provincial boundaries in South Vietnam were rearranged with the result that An Giang Province no longer borders Cambodia. Chau Doc Province is now on the Cambodian border.

provinces most often cited. The relative importance of each area, route, or mode cannot be determined from available information. It appears that the Viet Cong shift back and forth from land to water transport and from one area of entry to another as the need and tactical situation change.

45. Use of inland water transport to cross the border in the southern and delta area seems to be much more important than it is from the north-eastern part of Cambodia into central South Vietnam. Four inland water routes, the Se San, the Sre Pok, and its two tributaries, provide access from Cambodia to Kontum, Pleiku, and Darlac Provinces in the central area. These waterways can accommodate small native craft only, and, although few reports are available to indicate the Viet Cong have used these water routes, their importance is accentuated by the scarcity of roads serving the area. There are six waterways providing access to the southern or delta area, of which three serve Tay Ninh Province and two consist of the Mekong-Bassac River complex. These southern rivers, which for the most part are navigable for craft as large as small oceangoing steamers, provide connections to most points in the delta area.

46. Water transport on the Mekong-Bassac River complex was one of the major means of moving supplies from Cambodia into South Vietnam until 1964. During 1963 a significant quantity of supplies, particularly explosives, was captured by South Vietnamese patrols on the rivers, but since that year reported seizures of explosives on the rivers have virtually ceased. This situation may mean that the Viet Cong have developed other water transport routes or are relying more heavily on land routes. A shift from water to land transport was revealed in 1964 in a captured document

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from the Finance and Economic Section of Chau Thanh District of Tay Ninh Province which stated that its transport units had to use cross-country land routes because movements by water were often stopped and searched. Viet Cong use of water transport undoubtedly continues, however, because some areas can be reached only by water transport or by a combination of land and water transport. A description of a logistic system on a river route [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The explosives were smuggled from Phnom Penh on a ship to a point within 1 mile of the border. The explosives were then transferred to small junks downstream at night to about 5 miles below the border from where other crews took over. In the first 3 months of 1963 about 3 to 5 tons of explosives were transported almost every other day in this fashion by one or two boats. The materials were well camouflaged in sacks under layers of sand, salt, or fruit or in false bottoms and tops of the boats. [REDACTED] the Viet Cong man the boats themselves when certain materials such as rifles and ammunition are being transported.

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47. The land routes provide access at many points along the Cambodian border for Viet Cong cadres, supporters, or purchasing agents to obtain supplies as necessary. Motorable routes possibly used for this purpose include at least 6 roads that cross the border between Quang Duc Province and the Gulf of Siam. Evidence exists that before crossing the border porters fan out from the roads onto the complex of trails to portage their loads. In other cases the agents mingle with the local traffic that crosses the border by vehicle or on foot. Four of the major land routes that enter South Vietnam through Tay Ninh Province reportedly have been used to trans-

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port weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment. Two routes enter

the province from the north, one from the west, and one from the south. The

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Viet Cong, [] have assembled as many as 300 porters at one time to carry their supplies across the border. An Giang Province, located on the south side of the Mekong, is another area through which land supply routes pass. []

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[] in March 1963 [] the Viet Cong crossed the border almost nightly. [] supplies were taken to the border and there picked up by the Viet Cong. []

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[] Points of entry into An Giang and Phuoc Long

Provinces are unknown.

Organizational Control

48. Information on organizations that control the infiltration of supplies from Cambodia is very sparse. An example of such an organization, however, probably is the above-mentioned Finance and Economic Section of the Chau Thanh District of Tay Ninh Province. This section may be only one of many such organizations along the border or it may be the principal one that serves COSVN. [] in May 1964 the section was composed of a section chief with his deputy and 5 helpers and 3 units or cells. One unit consisted of 5 men who recruited 7 Cambodians and 4 Vietnamese tradesmen to purchase goods in Cambodia, and 3 other men who were only in charge of purchases of goods from local markets. Another unit consisted of a village organized into 5 water transport units and 12 land transport units. The third was a motor boat cell. In May 1964 the

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section purchased in Cambodia about 15 tons of supplies, including many types of food, cloth, dry cell batteries, electric wire, and medicine. In addition the list of purchased items included about 90 animals.

Viet Cong Bases in Cambodian Territory

49. While there is considerable evidence that the Viet Cong use the Cambodian border area as a sanctuary and bivouac area for varying periods, there is no confirmation of reports received during the past few years that they have established permanent military bases, rest camps, training areas, hospitals, workshops, or storage facilities. Most reports of such facilities have been obtained [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Seldom has the same information been obtained from two individual sources. Careful studies [REDACTED] of suspected Viet Cong military installations have invariably indicated that they were long since abandoned or were not military installations in the first place. Even though the Viet Cong obtain supplies in Cambodia or transport them through Cambodia, there is no evidence that large stockpiles are maintained there for any period of time.

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50. Recent reports cannot be confirmed or denied that the headquarters of the PAVN 325th Division, elements of which are known to have infiltrated into South Vietnam, is located in northeastern Cambodia in the area bordering Laos and South Vietnam. The area in question is remote, mountainous, and sparsely inhabited only by tribesmen, and the headquarters of the 325th Division could be in any one of the three countries at any given time. In the past, some captured Viet Cong have stated that they had infiltrated into South Vietnam via Cambodia so there is precedent for the use of this area by Communist forces.

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Cambodian Government Collusion

51. There is no question that the Cambodian government has taken an attitude increasingly favorable to the Communists in the Vietnamese situation. The Cambodian government has expressed its official goodwill diplomatically and politically for the NFSLV, but stated that Cambodian neutrality forbids its operational and logistic cooperation. Sihanouk has made public statements supporting the NFSLV's claim to represent the Vietnamese people; he sponsored the Indochinese Peoples Conference at Phnom Penh in February; he has presented medical supplies to the victims of American bombing in North Vietnam; and he presided at a ceremony in which medical supplies were presented to a representative of the NFSLV. He also participated in negotiations concerning the Cambodian/South Vietnamese border with representatives of North Vietnam and the Front in December 1964, though he was disappointed in these negotiations as neither the Front nor Hanoi was willing to give him the border guarantees he desired. In short, Sihanouk's open political support of the NFSLV has helped the Front in developing its international image as the "legitimate" representative of the South Vietnamese people.

52. However, there is no hard evidence that the central Cambodian government is actively or knowingly providing logistic support to the Viet Cong, beyond the gift of medical supplies mentioned above. There is no conclusive evidence that Communist arms being brought in openly through Sihanoukville are intended for other than the Cambodian armed forces although it is conceivable that some may have ultimately gone to the Viet Cong. It is also conceivable that the Cambodian Ministry of Commerce

knowingly assisted the Viet Cong by granting licenses to Cambodian firms to import explosive materials in excess of domestic needs for eventual diversion to the Viet Cong. The Cambodian government did, however, seize a shipment of potassium chlorate moving down the Mekong in September 1963 and turned the confiscated material over the royal palace for the manufacture of fireworks.

53. There is some evidence of cooperation with the Viet Cong at lower Cambodian government and military levels. Despite the fact that Cambodian authorities have occasionally taken well publicized actions against Viet Cong border crossers and arrested Viet Cong personnel in Cambodia, there are other reports of Viet Cong being permitted to take refuge from South Vietnamese military forces in Cambodia, at times apparently with the active assistance of Cambodian armed forces. There have even been some low-level reports of Cambodian and Viet Cong troops fighting together against South Vietnamese troops, and Viet Cong prisoners of war in 1964 stated that the Cambodian troops attempted to cover up their cooperation with the insurgents. Prisoners have also reported that local Cambodian authorities have made no effort to interfere with Viet Cong procurement of supplies in Cambodia. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] reported that Cambodian soldiers assisted the Viet Cong in trucking ammunition and explosives to the border. Cambodian villagers and even Cambodian military units in the border areas reportedly regard the Viet Cong as protectors or allies and not invaders.

54. In sum, it is difficult to estimate reliably the extent to which Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory is due to active Cambodian cooperation, passive "laissez-faire," or simply the inability of the Cambodian government to control or even patrol its frontiers. It is also possible that some local officials may help the Viet Cong for personal profit or out of fear of reprisal.

VI. INITIAL SOURCES AND INTERMEDIARY HANDLERS OF EXTERNALLY PROVIDED SUPPLIES


55. The initial sources of externally provided supplies are principally Communist China, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, France, and the US. The countries through which most of these supplies pass immediately before infiltration into South Vietnam are most likely North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, although direct shipments to the South Vietnam coast from other Bloc countries are possible.

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56. Supplies that are moved via North Vietnam most likely are transported by rail through Kwangsi Province, China, into North Vietnam.

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Although these materials undoubtedly were destined for the PAVN forces, supplies for the Viet Cong apparently are taken from PAVN storage areas. Reports are also available indicating that military supplies have been moved from China by junk or small coastal ships to various points along the North Vietnamese coast. Although it is possible that war material is moved into Haiphong by merchant ship, no such shipments have been detected.

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about 175 of the ships belonged to Bloc countries, and a considerable proportion of the Free World ships calling there were chartered to Bloc countries. some merchant ships have offloaded

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cargo into junks and other small craft before entering the port of Haiphong. Such cargo could have been destined for sea infiltration into South Vietnam, much of which seems to originate in the Haiphong area.

57. For the most part, supplies for the Viet Cong that move from Cambodia arrive in Cambodia through normal commercial channels, and principally aboard Free World ships. Very few ships from Communist countries call at Sihanoukville, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The total tonnage is relatively small and the bulk of it consists of non-military supplies. Only slightly over 1,000 tons of cargo were delivered to Sihanoukville from the USSR and East Europe in the first half of 1965, while only three Chinese Communist ships called at the port during the same period. One of these ships carried only commercial goods; one carried commercial goods and material for a small ordnance plant which China had promised to build for Cambodia; and the third carried a significant amount of military equipment -- in partial fulfillment of China's promise to equip about 22,000 Cambodian troops. Since 1963 there have been only about 10 Communist military deliveries to Cambodia. The items delivered have ranged from spare parts and ammunition to MIG aircraft, but there has been no effort by Cambodia, Communist China, or the USSR to conceal these deliveries, and Prince Sihanouk has provided a detailed breakdown of the weapons supplied. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

It seems unlikely, therefore, that any significant amount of this new

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equipment or ammunition has been supplied to the Viet Cong, although some of the replaced equipment may have been turned over to the Viet Cong.

58. The weapons and ammunition that have been shipped to the Viet Cong through Cambodia probably were smuggled into Cambodia by sampans or junks, or over land routes, or obtained from commercial channels in Cambodia. Potassium chlorate, a chemical used in making matches, but which can also be used in making explosives, is an example of a military item which may be obtained by the Viet Cong through commercial channels in Cambodia. Between 1961 and 1963, Cambodian imports of potassium chlorate increased about 10 times [REDACTED]

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although there was no comparable increase in the use of matches in Cambodia. Valid licenses for all imports of this chemical were issued to established business firms in Cambodia.

59. In addition to explosives, other military supplies for the Viet Cong which are being or have been imported through commercial channels include communications equipment and medical supplies. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

the Nam Phuang Import-Export Company, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, was expected to send a shipment of tactical radio equipment to the Viet Cong in the near future. The shipment, consisting of about 50 radio sets manufactured in Japan, was to be made from Phnom Penh to Tay Ninh, South Vietnam. On 3 September 1965, Prince Sihanouk presented a gift of medical supplies to a representative of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. These supplies probably were imported from abroad by the Cambodian government through normal commercial channels.

ANNEX A

BLOC-SUPPLIED AND LOCALLY PRODUCED WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION
PROBABLY HELD BY THE VIET CONG MAIN FORCE UNITS
BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

1. Communist China

a. Weapons:

7.62-mm Pistol, Model 54

7.62-mm Semi-automatic carbine, Model 56 (copy of Soviet SKS)

7.62-mm Carbine, Model 53 (copy of Soviet M44)

7.62-mm Assault rifle, Model 56 (copy of Soviet AK)

7.62-mm Sub-machinegun, Model 50

7.62-mm Sub-machinegun, Model K50

7.62-mm Sub-machinegun (copy of Soviet PPSH) VC modified

7.62-mm Light machinegun, Model 53 (copy of Soviet DP)

7.62-mm Light machinegun, Model 56 (copy of Soviet RPD)

7.62-mm Heavy machinegun, Model 58 (copy of Soviet GORYUNOV)

7.92-mm Light machinegun (copy of BRNO)

7.92-mm Heavy machinegun, Model 24 (copy of Soviet MAXIM)

12.7-mm Heavy machinegun, Model 54 (copy of Soviet DShK)

40-mm Grenade launcher, Model 56 (copy of Soviet RPG-2)

57-mm Recoilless gun (rifle), Model 36

75-mm Recoilless gun (rifle), Model 52 (copy of US M20)

75-mm Recoilless gun (rifle), Model 56

Flame thrower (tentatively CHICOM)

60-mm Mortar, Model 31

82-mm Mortar

90-mm AT Rocket launcher, Model 51

b. Ammunition:

7.62-mm Cartridge, Model P

7.62-mm Cartridge, Model 50

7.62-mm Cartridge, Model 53

7.62-mm Cartridge, Model 56

7.62-mm Cartridge, Model L

7.62-mm Cartridge, Model API B32

7.92-mm Cartridge

12.7-mm Cartridge

40-mm Grenade, PG-2

60-mm Shell, mortar

82-mm Shell, mortar

75-mm Shell, Recoilless gun

2. USSR

a. Weapons:

7.62-mm Carbine, Model M44

7.62-mm Rifle, Model M1891

7.62-mm Sub-machinegun, Model PPSH 41

7.62-mm Light machinegun, Model RP46

23-mm Cannon

b. Ammunition:

7.62-mm Cartridge, Model P

7.62-mm Cartridge, API, Model B-32

3. Czechoslovakia

a. Weapons:

7.65-mm Pistol, Model M1927, N B46

b. Ammunition (sample of each type exploited):

7.92-mm Cartridge, rifle

7.92-mm Cartridge, Mauser

4. Viet Cong-Produced Materiel

a. Weapons and Explosive Devices:

Skyhorse (VC Type-Bazooka)

Grenade launcher

AA Machinegun (modified from US 50 caliber MG)

AT Parachute hand grenade

Bicycle mine

Mine delay firing device

Shaped charge (2 types)

Shaped mine, short cone type

Hollow cone mine, non-electric

AP mine, cylindrical type

AP fragmentation grenades (2 types)

AT mine, cast iron fragmentation

AT mine (constructed from British 100-mm mortar shell)

AT mine, iron case, cylindrical

AT mine, wooden, box type

Mine, turtle shaped, cement

Mine, turtle shaped, sheet metal

Mine, betel box shaped, cement

Mine, round volume type, sheet metal

Mine, round mound type, cement

Mine, 81-mm mortar container

Fixed directional fragmentation mine, Model DH-10

Incendiary grenade, sodium

Chemical firing device

AP mine, match box size

Antenna detonating device

ANNEX B

COMMUNIST TRUCK TRAFFIC REPORTED [REDACTED]
 SELECTED ROUTES IN SOUTHERN LAOS
 DECEMBER 1964 - JUNE 1965

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Route Number and Month	Number of Trucks Reported Moving		Number of Days Covered by Reports	Average Number of Trucks Moving Per Day a/	
	South	North		South	North
Route 23 b/					
December 1964 c/	185	12	5	37	2
January 1965	337	324	22	15	15
February 1965	311	172	27	12	6
March d/ 1965	481	658	30	16	22
April 1965	640	775	30	21	26
May 1965	340	541	24	14	23
Sub-total	<u>2,294</u>	<u>2,482</u>	<u>138</u>	17	18
June 1965	0	0	5	0	0
Total	<u>2,294</u>	<u>2,482</u>	<u>143</u>	16	17

Route 92 e/

February 1965	13	15	19	0.7	0.8
March 1965	11	12	21	0.5	0.6
April 1965	66	58	20	3.3	2.9
May 1965	27	35	26	1.0	1.4
1-5 June 1965	7	7	5	1.4	1.4
Sub-total	<u>124</u>	<u>127</u>	<u>91</u>	1.4	1.4
6-30 June 1965	0	0	17	0	0
Total	<u>124</u>	<u>127</u>	<u>108</u>	1.2	1.2

a/ Total number of trucks reported during the month divided by the number of days covered by reports during the month.

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c/ Of these trucks, 170 were reported from other points on days when there was no coverage in this area. Since these 170 trucks would have had to pass this area, they have been included in this tabulation.

d/ The direction of an additional 4 trucks was not given.

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22 September 1965

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LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR THE
COMMUNIST FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

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GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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